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In the context of social evolution, the ecological drivers of selection are the phenotypes of other individuals. The social environment can thus evolve, potentially changing the adaptive value for different social strategies. Different branches of evolutionary
biology have traditionally focused on different aspects of these feedbacks. Here, we synthesize behavioral ecology theory concerning evolutionarily stable strategies when fitness is frequency dependent with quantitative genetic models providing statistical
descriptions of evolutionary responses to social selection. Using path analyses, we review how social interactions influence the
strength of selection and how social responsiveness, social impact, and non-random social assortment affect responses to social
selection. We then detail how the frequency-dependent nature of social interactions fits into this framework and how it imposes
selection on traits mediating social responsiveness, social impact, and social assortment, further affecting evolutionary dynamics.
Throughout, we discuss the parameters in quantitative genetics models of social evolution from a behavioral ecology perspective
and identify their statistical counterparts in empirical studies. This integration of behavioral ecology and quantitative genetic perspectives should lead to greater clarity in the generation of hypotheses and more focused empirical research regarding evolutionary
pathways and feedbacks inherent in specific social interactions.
KEY WORDS:

Frequency dependence, game theory, genetic relatedness, indirect genetic effects, kin selection, quantitative ge-
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Competition, cooperation, communication, and sexual reproduction provide the ecological context for powerful evolutionary
forces (West-Eberhard 1979; Krebs and Davies 1991; Westneat
and Fox 2010). Social evolution is concerned with the evolution of phenotypes mediating these interactions and the impact
they have on the fitness of individuals other than the actor (Frank
1998). A distinguishing feature of social traits is that the ecological environment in which such traits operate includes the
phenotypes of other individuals. Thus, the social part of the
environment is underpinned by genes and can evolve in response
to selection (Kirkpatrick and Lande 1989; Wolf et al. 1998; WestEberhard 1979). Furthermore, the optimal phenotype for an individual depends in part on the genetic and phenotypic characteristics of the individuals with whom it interacts (Maynard-Smith
and Price 1973; McNamara and Weissing 2010). This implies that

social evolution creates a feedback between ecological and evolutionary processes, because the evolving phenotypes are also the
ecological drivers of selection.
Different areas of evolutionary biology have used different
approaches to study evolution in a social context. Behavioral
ecology has explored the economics of social evolution using
cost-benefit analyses (see Westneat and Fox 2010). One of the
biggest contributions was providing an adaptive explanation to
seemingly maladaptive “altruistic behaviors” through the process
of kin selection (Hamilton 1964). In addition, game theory (e.g.,
Maynard-Smith and Price 1973) extended adaptive explanations
to a broader array of social contexts, allowing predictions for
evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) in frequency-dependent scenarios where the fitness effects of a social trait depend on the
traits of social partners (Maynard Smith 1982; McNamara and

© 2020 The Authors. Evolution published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of The Society for the Study of Evolution
1894

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
work is properly cited.

Evolution 74-9: 1894–1907

PERSPECTIVE

Weissing 2010). Models developed by quantitative geneticists
have also greatly contributed to the study of social behavior, allowing the quantification of how social interactions generate variation in fitness in the form of social selection gradients (Wolf
et al. 1999; Okasha 2006; Queller 1992b), and how patterns of inheritance are affected by individuals plastically adjusting to their
social environment in the form of indirect genetic effects (IGEs;
Moore et al. 1997). Importantly, quantitative genetic models of
social evolution provide an approach for the study of responses
to selection when related and un-related individuals interact, and
directly connect statistical parameters to their theoretical counterparts (Frank 1998; Wolf et al. 1999; McGlothlin et al. 2010,
2014).
Quantitative genetic and behavioral ecology approaches together provide a general framework for studying social evolution.
While behavioral ecology theory provides explanations regarding
the ecology of long-term selection resulting in evolutionarily stable social strategies (Krebs and Davies 1991; Westneat and Fox
2010), quantitative genetic models can be used to derive shortterm statistical descriptions of evolutionary responses to separate selection events (Frank 1997; Wolf et al. 1999). Despite their
complementary aims, game theory and quantitative genetic models of social evolution differ in how they deal with the dynamics
of evolutionary changes in the social environment feeding back
to alter selection (Heino et al. 1998; Lion 2018). Such feedback
is a result of the frequency dependence inherent in game theory (McGill and Brown 2007) and are essential for understanding long-term evolution. However, the role of these feedbacks is
not made explicit when predicting short-term responses to selection on an event-by-event basis using quantitative genetic models
(Heino et al. 1998; Lion 2018). This difference may have resulted
in the frequency-dependent processes causing evolutionary feedbacks to be partly overlooked in social evolution studies based on
the indirect genetic effects framework (Westneat 2012). A more
explicit exploration of the connections between short-term predictions of the responses to selection with long-term expectations
concerning evolutionarily stable strategies is needed to better understand the feedbacks caused by social evolution.
In this paper, we detail how behavioral ecology and quantitative genetics together make it possible to address four key features necessary to understand the evolutionary dynamics of social
traits: (1) the optimal phenotype for an individual depends on the
social environment; (2) the social environment has genes and may
evolve; (3) how individuals choose, impact, or respond to their
social environments can affect selection; and (4) how individuals choose, impact, or respond to their social environment can
also evolve, further affecting the evolutionary dynamics of social
traits. We first describe the sources of selection and the evolutionary feedback caused by interacting social strategies. We then
review some theoretical models describing how social respon-

siveness, social impact, and non-random social assortment can
each affect responses to social selection (Queller 1992b; Moore
et al. 1997; Wolf et al. 1999; McGlothlin et al. 2010). Building
upon this framework, we then detail how interactive fitness effects of the traits of social partners fit into this framework and
create selection on the ability to choose, impact, or respond to
social environments, further altering the evolutionary dynamics
of social traits.

Understanding the Ecology of
Selection in a Social Context
Quantitative genetic models of social evolution define the statistical parameters that need to be quantified in empirical studies of social evolution (Table 1). The Price equation describes
how the phenotypic change in the mean trait of a population occurs through processes generating a covariance between phenotype and fitness (Robertson 1966; Price 1970). The role of social interactions in the evolutionary process similarly involves
the covariance between phenotype and fitness, and it includes
how the fitness of an individual is affected by its own phenotype as well as by the phenotype(s) of the social partner(s).
Queller (1985, 1992b) described in regression form how social
interactions may affect fitness, and the explicit link to the multiple regression approach of Lande and Arnold (1983) was then
pointed out by Frank (1997). Following the notation of more recent treatments of the topic (e.g., Wolf et al. 1999), a statistical description of how social interactions generate variation in
fitness is:
w = α + βN z + βS z + βI zz + ε,

(1)

here, w represents the relative fitness of focal individuals and z
is the phenotypic trait of those individuals. α is a constant representing the intercept in a statistical model and ε represents all the
un-modeled factors affecting the fitness of individuals. βN is the
“non-social” selection gradient relating the relative fitness (w) of
individuals to their phenotype z (Wolf et al. 1999). We denote the
relevant trait of social partner(s) as z and this trait can be the same
or different to the trait of the focal individual under study. Importantly, z can represent the expression of a trait by a social partner
in one instance, the mean social trait over time of a specific partner, or the mean social trait value for a social group (Heisler and
Damuth 1987; Svensson and Connallon 2019). The term βS represents the effect of the phenotype (z ) of the social partner(s)
or group on the fitness of the focal individuals (w) while controlling for the effect of their own phenotype. The effect of one social
partner is referred to as the social selection gradient in a neighbormodulated approach of selection (Frank 1998; Wolf et al. 1999;
Okasha 2006; Queller 1992a). The neighbor-modulated approach
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Table 1.

Notation for the parameters used in the social evolution models and their biological interpretation, plus references to previous

use and possible alternative notation in the literature.

Symbol

Meaning

w, w
z, z
a, a
e, e
zz
CZZ 
CAZ

Relative fitness of focal individual (w) and social partner (w ).
Phenotypic trait of focal individual (z) and social partner (z ).
Breeding values of focal individual (a) and social partner phenotypes (a ).
Environmental effects on the phenotype of a focal individual (e) and its social partners (e ).
Aggregate phenotype from the interaction between z and z (Px Py in Queller 1992b).
Covariance between traits of interacting individuals (Ci j in Wolf et al. 1999).
Covariance between breeding values and focal trait values - i.e. additive genetic variance (McGlothlin et al.
2010) and Cov(Gx , Px ) in Queller (1992b).
Covariance between breeding values of the focal individual and trait values of social partners (McGlothlin
et al. 2010; and Cov(Gx , Py ) in Queller 1992b).
Covariance between breeding values of focal individual and the aggregate property zz (Cov(Gx , Px Py ) in
Queller 1992b).
Social responsiveness of focal individuals to their social environment (ψ in Moore et al. 1997; and βGx , PY
in Queller 1992b).
Social impact of focal individuals on its social environment (βP P in Queller 2011).
Genetic relatedness between the focal individual and its social environment (Queller 1992a).
Non-social selection gradient (Wolf et al. 1999; see βC in Heisler & Damuth 1987; βWx , Px in Queller 1992b;
and βwz.y in Frank 1997).
Social selection gradient (Wolf et al. 1999; see βC in Heisler & Damuth 1987; βWY , Py in Queller 1992b; and
βwy.z in Frank 1997).
Interaction coefficient (Wolf et al. 1999; see βWXY , PX Py in Queller 1992b).
Phenotypic change from one generation to the next (Lande 1979).
Selection differential (Lande 1979).

CAZ 
CAZZ 
ψzz
ψzz
r
βN
βS
βI
z̄
s

can be extended to study the effect of a group of individuals by
fitting the mean phenotype of a social group excluding the focal
individual (Wolf et al. 1999; Bijma and Wade 2008), while including the focal individual in the estimation of the mean group
phenotype results in the group selection coefficient in a contextual analysis of selection (Heisler and Damuth 1987; Goodnight
et al. 1992). The term βI describes how the relationship between
trait and fitness depends upon the social environment in which it
is expressed (Queller 1985, 1992b, 2011). The interactive fitness
effect coefficient is estimated as a statistical interaction using the
product of the interacting traits (zz ). We can visualize the fitness
consequences of social interactions as a fitness surface (Fig. 1),
where the interactive fitness effects coefficient (βI ) causes the
surface to be warped.
The term βI zz describes the circumstance in game theoretic
models where fitness of one strategy depends on the strategy of
the opponent, or its social group (Queller 1984, 1992b). Studying how the fitness of a phenotype depends on mean phenotype
of the population (z̄ ) is analogous to what game theorists term
“playing the field” (p. 23, Maynard Smith 1982), where individuals are assumed to always interact with the entire population
or with a sample of the population with representative probability. This also represents a scenario of frequency-dependent selection, where the fitness of a phenotype depends on its frequency in
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the population (Heino et al. 1998). There are two key empirical
considerations to study frequency-dependent selection. (1) It is
not possible to study how frequency-dependent selection affects
the evolutionary trajectory of a social trait by focusing on single
episodes of selection in isolation. It requires analyzing together
several selection events (e.g., breeding seasons) and quantifying
how the relationship between phenotypes and fitness is affected
by changes in the mean phenotype of the population. (2) Mean
centring for each episode of selection should be avoided, because
it results in the mean phenotype within each episode of selection
always equalling zero, causing this type of frequency-dependent
selection to be completely overlooked. Importantly, when there
are interactive fitness effects and they are overlooked, they will
be subsumed into the direct and social selection gradient estimates. Therefore, unexplained fluctuations in estimates of the direct and social selection gradients for single episodes of selection
may arise due to un-modeled interactive fitness effects. Including the interaction coefficient in an analysis of selection defines
the direct and social selection gradients as the relationships between the focal and social phenotype when the mean focal and
social phenotype values are zero. If the mean focal and social
phenotype across all the selection events are centered around zero
(and not per selection event), then the direct and social selection
gradients can be interpreted as the effect of the focal and social

PERSPECTIVE

Figure 1.

Fitness surfaces representing how the fitness of the focal phenotype is a function of its social environment. The curvature is

determined by the interactive fitnesss coeffcient (βI ) .The circles depict the evolutionary dynamics of aggressiveness in two simulated
scenarios of negative frequency dependence, where individuals interact at random and assuming perfect inheritance as in standard
game theory. Aggressiveness increases fitness when the average aggressiveness in the population is close to zero (βN = 0.01) in both
scenarios, but the benefits of being aggressive decrease as the population average aggressivness increases (i.e., as in the hawk-dove
game). In scenario (A), βI equals 0.02 and in scenario (B), βI equals 0.015. The circles depict the evolutionary trajectory toward the ESS,
blue represents less agresssive while red represents more aggressive population average phenotype. The evolutionary equilibrium is
achieved when the selection differential equals zero. The greater βI in (A), represented as a more warped fitness surface, thus results in
a lower ESS level of mean aggressivenss in the population (z’) – see Appendix S2.

phenotype on the fitness of the focal individual in the average
social environment over the study period.
Despite its importance in game theory models, the role of
the interactive fitness coefficient (βI ) in determining responses
to selection has not been fully appreciated (Westneat 2012), potentially because of the common statistical practice of mean
centering the phenotype in each episode of selection. Theoretical studies of social evolution have highlighted the importance
of interactive fitness effects in the context of synergistic effects
(Queller 1985, 1992b, 2011), and Westneat (2012) has advocated
for its integration into the indirect genetic effects (IGE) framework explicitly. However, interactive fitness effects have been
largely neglected in theoretical IGE models (see appendix A1 in
Wolf et al. 1999). This is also the case empirically. For instance,
social selection gradients have been estimated in different taxa
using both neighbor-modulated approach and multi-level selection analyses (Stevens et al. 1995; Eldakar et al. 2010; Formica
et al. 2011; Fisher et al. 2017; Santostefano et al. 2019), but to our
knowledge, there are few studies that have estimated interactive
fitness effects (e.g., Brodie and Agrawal 2001; Santostefano et al.
2019). The lack of empirical estimates and their omission in some
theoretical treatments of social evolution is hampering our ability
to understand, describe, and ultimately predict the evolutionary
trajectories of social traits.

Interacting fitness effects, as described in Equation 1, will
determine the strength of selection acting on phenotypes. We can
describe the magnitude and strength of selection in the trajectory of a population toward the ESS by focusing on the selection
differentials (s) across selection events (Robertson 1966; Price
1970; Lande and Arnold 1983). The vector of such selection differentials (s) across time can be described as:


s = βN + βI z̄ P + (βS + βI z̄)CZZ  ,

(2)

where the first term is a function of the non-social selection
gradient (βN ) and the phenotypic variance (P) of trait z, with
βI describing how the relationship between phenotype and relative fitness depends upon the mean social environment (z̄ ).
The second term (βS + βI z̄)CZZ  represents the strength of social selection. This term shows that the net force of social selection in a particular selection event depends upon the social selection gradient (βS ), the interactive fitness effect (βI )
and the mean focal phenotype (z̄), all moderated by the covariance between the phenotypes of interacting individuals (CZZ  ).
Similar formulations of this equation have been presented elsewhere, for instance in Queller (1992b) and in the appendix
of Wolf et al. (1999). Here, we present a different formulation to highlight that the relationship between the focal trait
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and fitness is modulated by the interactive fitness effects (see
Appendix S1 for details on the derivation), thereby explicitly
linking these equations with game theory.
When there are interactive fitness effects, even in the absence of a covariance between the traits of interacting individuals,
the net force of selection is a function of the mean social environment. We use the explicit definition of frequency dependence
in game theory models for continuous traits, usually described
as W(z, z̄ ), where the fitness function W relating the phenotype
z to fitness w is a function of the mean social environment (z̄ )
(McGill and Brown 2007). Consider the classic hawk-dove game
example (Maynard Smith and Price 1973) in which two fixed
types interact at random. We can extend this model to a quantitative trait defined as aggressiveness. In this simple scenario,
βI captures the negative frequency dependence of such a game
(Queller 1984) and how the adaptive value of playing “hawk”
or “dove” depends upon the mean aggressiveness in the social
environment. If we know both βN and βI , we can then predict
how populations will arrive at the ESS (see the colored circles
in Fig. 1). Measuring βI thus enables predicting the equilibrium
mean aggressiveness (ESS) and the evolutionary responses after
stochastic perturbations shifting the mean phenotype away from
the ESS (see Appendix S2). Interactive fitness effects imply
that the strength of selection varies as the mean population
phenotype changes, which is consistent with the idea that the rate
of evolution slows as the population approaches the ESS (Fig. 1;
Fig. S1). Interactive fitness effects are therefore a key component
of social evolution models and thus need to be considered when
empirically studying the evolutionary dynamics of social traits.

Predicting Evolutionary Responses
in a Social Context
Phenotypic responses to selection occur via various pathways
causing covariation between genes and fitness (Frank 1997;
Queller 1992b). Following standard quantitative genetic assumptions, we can describe the additive genetic effects on a phenotypic trait using breeding values (Falconer and Mackay 1996).
We can alter Equation 2 to predict the changes in the mean phenotype across generations (z̄) by including how the breeding
values in the focal individual co-vary with its phenotype (i.e., the
additive genetic variance, CAZ ), and how the breeding values in
the focal individual co-vary with the phenotype of its social environment (CAZ  ). This last term describes the genetic underpinning of the covariance between the phenotypes of interacting individuals (CZZ  ), which results in a genetically explicit version of
Equation 2:


z̄ = βN + βI z̄ CAZ + (βS + βI z̄)CAZ  .
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(3)

Phenotypic change across generations is a function of additive genetic variation in the trait (CAZ ), the non-social selection gradient and how the interactive fitness effects modulate
the adaptive value of the phenotype (βN + βI z̄ ). Evolutionary
change will also be a function of the social selection gradient, the
mean focal trait, and any interactive fitness effects (βS + βI z̄), if
the genes of the focal individual and the phenotype of its social
partner co-vary (CAZ  = 0). Versions of this equation, but without
the interactive fitness effects have been presented elsewhere (e.g.,
McGlothlin et al. 2010). Equation 3 as we present it here explicitly describes evolutionary changes across generations, combining the frequency dependence described in game theory (Queller
1984, 1985; Westneat 2012) with the genetic underpinnings of
the covariance between the phenotypes of interacting individuals
(Frank 1997; Wolf et al. 1999; McGlothlin et al. 2010).

The Social Evolution Path Diagram
How social interactions affect inheritance and selection can be
studied using path analyses. This approach is general, as the
different processes that affect phenotypic evolution can be described via different formulations of the Price equation (Price
1970; Frank 1997; Queller 2017), which can then be modified
into specific multiple regressions (Lande and Arnold 1983) and
then combined with path analytical models (Wright 1934; Frank
1997; Morrissey 2014) to be used in empirical studies. The use
of path analyses to understand selection has a long history in
evolutionary genetics (Wright 1934; Kingsolver and Schemske
1991; Scheiner et al. 2000) and the path analytical representation has been used in several treatments of social evolution (McGlothlin et al. 2010; Queller 2011; Hadfield and Thomson 2017),
although not necessarily in a formal statistical manner (but see
Frank 1997). We use path analyses as both a conceptual and statistical tool to illustrate and link social evolution models with the
key parameters that empiricists need to estimate in evolutionary
studies of social behavior. The social path diagram focuses on the
causal pathways linking genes or breeding values a to relative fitness w (Fig. 2). Rearrangement of Equation 3 reveals how the
selection gradients define three routes by which the genes of the
focal individual can affects its fitness:



z̄ = CAZ βN + CAZ  βS + z̄CAZ + z̄CAZ  βI .

(4)

Wolf et al. (1999) provide a non-genetic version of this equation in their appendix, and in Appendix S1 of this paper we provide details on the formal derivation. We now discuss in turn the
mechanisms underpinning each of these routes in Figure 2.

PERSPECTIVE

ROUTE 1: DIRECT ROUTE TO FITNESS (βN )

The first term in Equation 4, CAZ βN , represents the direct route
to fitness (Fig. 2A) providing a causal pathway linking breeding
values (a) to relative fitness (w). Path 1 links breeding values with
the phenotype and path 2 links phenotype and fitness via the nonsocial selection gradient (βN ). For tractability in the path analysis,
we can assume that the breeding values are scaled by their variance. In this way, path 1 is equal to the additive genetic variance
of the focal trait and can be estimated using pedigree information (Wilson et al. 2010). The evolutionary change caused by this
route can then be estimated by multiplying its paths (p1 p2 ).
ROUTE 2: INDIRECT ROUTES THROUGH THE SOCIAL
SELECTION GRADIENT (βS )

Figure 2.

Path diagrams of social evolution. Symbols in solid line

boxes are measured variables, symbols in dashed line boxes represent unmeasured (statistically inferred) variables. Numbers in
circles are paths (ρ) representing the relationships between variables. (A) Indirect routes to fitness. ρ1 reflects the genetic underpinning of the focal individual’s trait, represented as the effect of
the breeding values a on trait z with e representing unmeasured
environmental effects. ρ2 is the relationship between the trait of
the focal individual z and its relative fitness w (βN ). ρ3 represents
a measure of genetic relatedness (r) between interacting individuals. ρ4 reflects the genetic underpinning of the trait z of social
partner(s), represented as the effect of genes a on trait z with
e again representing unmeasured environmental effects. ρ5 is the
relationship between the trait of the social partner z and the focal
individual’s fitness ω, which can be interpreted as the social selection gradient (βS ). ρ6 is the social impact (ψzz ) of the phenotype
of individual z on the phenotype z of the social partner(s). (B) Social responsiveness and the evolution of the social environment.
ρ7 represents the social responsiveness (ψz z ) of the phenotype of
the focal individual to the phenotype of its social partner. ρ9 represents the direct selective pressures (βN ) on the social partner(s)
phenotype and w’ the fitness of the social partner(s). (C) Interacting fitness effects. ρ9 and ρ10 represent the influences of the focal
and social partner(s) traits on the aggregate character zz . ρ11 represents interactive fitness effects (βI ) mediated by the aggregate
character (zz ).

The second term in Equation 4 (CAZ  βS ) describes the effect of
non-random distributions of genotypes in the social environment
and the social selection gradient (Frank 1997; Wolf et al. 1999;
McGlothlin et al. 2010). Whenever there is a covariance between
the genes of the focal individual and the phenotype of its social
partner(s) (CAZ  ), a nonzero social selection gradient (βS ) will
affect the evolutionary trajectory of a social trait. Relatedness
and indirect genetic effects (IGEs) may generate non-random
distributions of genes in the social environment, and their evolutionary consequences have been described elsewhere (Queller
1992a,b; Wolf et al. 1998; McGlothlin et al. 2010). Here, we
review their effects on responses to selection with the aim of
discussing the evolution of behavioral mechanisms underpinning
these processes. We classify these behavioral mechanisms as “social assortment,” “social impact,” and “social responsiveness”
(for equivalent concepts, see: Edelaar and Bolnick 2019).
Relatedness and social assortment
When interacting individuals are non-randomly assorted and the
fitness of the focal individual is affected by the phenotype of its
social partner, social selection can affect the evolutionary trajectory of a social trait (Queller 1992a; Frank 1997; McGlothlin
et al. 2014). In this scenario, the covariance between the genes
in the focal individual and the phenotype of its social partner(s)
(CAZ  in equation 4) can be caused by non-random social assortment, resulting in covariance between the breeding values of the
interacting partners (CAA ). The genetic covariance between the
traits of interacting individuals can be expressed as the regression coefficient r (Michod and Hamilton 1980; Queller 1992a),
which can be understood as a measure of genetic relatedness
(Grafen 1985). The importance of genetic relatedness in the evolution of social behavior is captured in Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton 1964a,b) and its neighbour-modulated version (Frank 1997;
McGlothlin et al. 2014; Queller 1992a) and, as such, plays a
key role in the evolution of cooperation (Grafen 1985). In general, the coefficient r (path 3, Fig. 2A) can represent all the be-
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havioural and demographic mechanisms that determine the genetic similarity between an individual and its social environment.
The parameter r can thus be a function of dispersal behaviour
determining population viscosity, genetically determined habitat choice where social interactions tend to be more likely between individuals of a similar genotype, or of kin discrimination where individuals preferentially interact with kin (Hamilton
1964). In addition, r can also represent the non-random assortment caused by mate choice (Andersson 1994). Therefore, despite the fact that we refer to this parameter as r in order to be
consistent with its reference to kin selection, it can also involve
other process that directly or indirectly result in a non-random
distribution of genotypes in social interactions (McGlothlin et al.
2010). In combination with the additive genetic variation of the
trait in the social partner(s) (path 4) and the social selection gradient (path 5), relatedness between interacting individuals (path 3)
defines an indirect route between the focal genes and fitness. Its
effect on evolutionary change can be estimated by the product of
these paths (p3 p4 p5 ).

Social impact
We use the term “social impact” to refer to situations where the
focal individual’s trait impacts the phenotype(s) of its social partner(s) (path 6, Fig. 2) and it creates an alternative social route
when the social partner(s) phenotype in turn influences the focal’s fitness (path 5, Fig. 2). In this scenario, the covariance between the genes underpinning the focal trait and the trait of the
social partner (CAZ  in equation 4) is a function of the average
social impact. This process has also been referred to as “kith
selection” by Queller (2011). Social impact plays an analogous
role to other forms of environmental modification, such as niche
construction (Odling-Smee et al. 2003; Saltz and Nuzhdin 2014),
but in this case individuals affect the phenotype(s) of interacting conspecifics. This route may represent any phenotype used
to manipulate a social partner. For example, z could represent a
sexual ornament in a male that induces a female to differentially
increase her care (z ) in their joint offspring (see Haaland et al.
2017). Trait z will increase a male’s fitness indirectly through its
effects on his female partner. This route is depicted by paths 1,
5, and 6 in Figure 2, and its effect on evolutionary change can be
estimated as their product (p1 p5 p6 ). When there is social impact,
the non-social selection gradient reflects the effect of the focal
phenotype on fitness independent of its indirect effect on fitness
through the phenotype of the social partner. Thus, the overall relationship between the phenotype and fitness comes from the direct
route plus the indirect routes (p1 p2 + p1 p5 p6 ). The path analysis clarifies that social impact will change the pattern of selection
through its indirect effect on fitness through the phenotype of the
social partner.
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Social responsiveness
We refer to “social responsiveness” in situations where the focal
individual adjusts its phenotype to that of the social partner (Van
Cleve and Akçay 2014; Dingemanse and Araya-Ajoy 2015). This
is a form of phenotypic plasticity that changes the pattern of inheritance of the focal trait (Moore et al. 1997). How the pattern of
inheritance can be changed in this way by social interactions has
been studied using indirect genetic effects models (IGEs: Griffing 1967; Moore et al. 1997) and their evolutionary consequences
have been well described in uni- and multivariate scenarios (Wolf
et al. 1998; McGlothlin et al. 2010). One of the key insights of
indirect genetic effect models (Moore et al. 1997) and early maternal effect models (Kirkpatrick and Lande 1989) is that even if
there is no (direct) genetic variance in the focal trait, changes in
the social environment may still result in a change in the mean
focal phenotype. Focusing on the paths of Figure 2, if there are
genes underpinning the expression of the social partner(s) trait
(p4 ), and there is also selection (p8 ) on the social partner(s) trait
(z ), then social responsiveness (p7 ) will lead to a change in the
mean phenotype of the focal trait. As an example, consider a simplified hypothetical two-trait scenario concerning parental provisioning behavior (z) of altricial offspring, where parents plastically adjust to the begging behavior of their offspring (z ) (see
Smiseth et al. 2008). If the mean begging behavior of the offspring increases from one generation to the next (z̄ ), perhaps
because offspring that begged more gained a selective advantage,
then the mean level of provisioning behavior in the next generation will also change due to the plastic response of parents, even
in the absence of a change in the gene frequencies for parental
provisioning behavior (a). This dynamic will have consequences
in terms of subsequent selective events on parental provisioning
z and offspring begging z before any type of ESS compromise is
reached (see Smiseth et al. 2008).

Impact, responsiveness and IGE models
A key parameter in indirect genetic effect (IGE) models is the
coefficient psi (ψ; Moore et al. 1997) representing the effect of
the phenotype of social partner(s) on the phenotype of a focal
individual (Van Cleve and Akçay 2014; Dingemanse and ArayaAjoy 2015). When viewed from a behavioral ecology perspective, this coefficient is in fact underpinned by two linked but different processes that we have defined (above) as “social impact”
and “social responsiveness.” Social responsiveness is related to
social impact, but when we refer to responsiveness, it is the phenotype of the social partner(s) that influences the phenotype of
the focal individual. In contrast, when we refer to impact, it is the
phenotype of the focal individual that affects the expression of
the social partner(s) phenotype. To clarify our argument, we start
by describing the phenotypic expression of the phenotype of the
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focal individual z and its social partner z , focusing on the coefficient ψ (Moore et al. 1997) but using the different subscripts to
denote directionality and causality:
z = c + ψz z z + a + e,

(5a)

z = c + ψzz z + a + e ,

(5b)

where a and e are the additive genetic effects and environmental variables affecting trait z of the focal individuals. As with z
(above), we denote with a prime the symbols for terms referring
to the phenotype of the social partner(s) that are analogous to the
parameters describing the phenotype of the focal individual. In
Equation 5b, c is the mean phenotype of the social environment,
a is the genetic underpinning (breeding value), and e represents
environmental effects on trait z . ψZ  Z in Equation 5a represents
the “social responsiveness” of the phenotype of the focal individual to the phenotype of its interacting partner(s). In contrast, ψZZ 
in Equation 5b represents “social impact” of the phenotype of the
focal individuals z on the phenotype of its interacting partner(s)
z . These effects can be non-reciprocal (one trait affects the other
trait, but not vice versa) versus reciprocal situations where the
two traits affect each other (Moore et al. 1997). When there are
non-reciprocal effects and the focal and social traits are different, it may be possible to distinguish between impact and responsiveness (e.g., a male’s ornament versus the female preference,
Andersson 1994; or parent provisioning and offspring begging,
Smiseth et al. 2008). However, in a scenario with reciprocal effects within the same trait, it may difficult to distinguish between
impact and responsiveness empirically, even if they are theoretically distinct (e.g., escalation in aggressive contests; Enquist and
Leimar 1983).
When the focal and the social environment phenotype are the
same (e.g., level of aggressiveness), then social impact and social
responsiveness can be seen as two sides of the same coin. Therefore, p6 and p7 in Figure 2 may be better represented as a single
double headed arrow (see Moore et al. 1997). It is also important
to note that in a scenario where traits are the same, then p2 and
p8 both reflect the relationship between the phenotype and fitness, but p2 is a partial regression coefficient measuring only the
direct effects of the trait on fitness, while p8 subsumes both the
direct and indirect effects. Furthermore, when the trait in the focal
individual and the trait in the social environment are the same or
there are reciprocal responses between different traits, there will
be feedback affecting the genetic underpinning of the traits further affecting the additive genetic variance of the focal trait and
thus its evolutionary trajectory even if the social selection gradient is zero (Moore et al. 1997; McGlothlin and Brodie 2009;
McGlothlin et al. 2010). Importantly, in both scenarios of reciprocal and non-reciprocal responses, the evolutionary consequences

of IGEs will be determined by the evolutionary compromise at
equilibrium (the ESS) between responsiveness and impact at the
population level. However, differentiating between social impact
and social responsiveness, and recognizing that different traits
can underlie these two processes, is essential for understanding
how selection may shape the average covariance between phenotypes and their social environment (Queller 2011; Edelaar and
Bolnick 2019).
ROUTE 3: THE INTERACTION EFFECT (βI )

Interactions in fitness effects between the focal and social partner(s) traits (βI ) are a major driving force of social evolution.
The product of the phenotypic values of interacting individuals
can be treated as an aggregate character resulting from the social interaction(s) experienced by the focal individual (Salt 1979;
Heisler and Damuth 1987). We can focus on the change in mean
phenotype in one selection event using an alternative formulation
of Equation 4 provided by Queller (1992b) to incorporate interacting fitness effects in terms of covariances between breeding
values and the traits:
z̄ = CAZ βN + CAZ  βS + βICAZZ  ,

(6)

here, CAZZ  represents the covariance between the breeding values
of the focal trait and the aggregate character zz . This shows that
the covariance between the aggregate property zz and the focal
phenotype breeding values mediate the contribution of interactive fitness effects on the responses to selection. The aggregate
trait zz can be estimated as the product of focal and social phenotypes, and can therefore be treated as another route by which
the genes of the focal individual can impact its fitness (Queller
1985, 1992a,b).
Using the formula for estimating the covariance between a
vector and a product (Bohrnstedt and Goldberger 1969; Brown
and Alexander 1991), we can show the underpinnings of the covariance between breeding values and the aggregate property zz .
This clarifies how Equation 6 relates to Equation 4, along with
some important underlying assumptions of this framework. We
can express the covariance between the breeding values of the
focal trait and the aggregate trait as:



CAZZ  = z̄CAZ  + z̄CAZ + E (a − ā) (z − z̄) z − z̄ . (7)
The term (z̄CAZ  + z̄CAZ ) describes the effect of the mean
population focal and social phenotypes on the covariances between the breeding values and the aggregate property zz . This
term is also in Equation 4, showing how the effects in the responses to selection of the mean focal and social phenotypes are
mediated by the interactive fitness effects βI (z̄CAZ  + z̄CAZ ). One
might expect that the covariance CAZZ  is nonzero if there is a genetic basis for the focal trait (CAZ = 0) or if there is covariance
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between the breeding values of the focal phenotype and the trait
of the social partner (CAZ  = 0). However, Equation 7 shows that
this will not be the case if the means of the focal and social phenotypes are set to zero. This again highlights certain undesirable
consequences of mean centering traits for each selection event in
scenarios where there is frequency dependence.
The second term in equation 7 is E [(a − ā)(z − z̄)(z − z̄ )],
where E refers to the expectation of the product inside the brackets, describes how any non-linear relationship between the three
variables will affect the covariance CAZZ  . This term will be zero
if variables conform to multivariate normality (Bohrnstedt and
Goldberger 1969). There are certain types of non-random social
assortments that will affect the skewness and kurtosis of the joint
distribution of breeding values and social and focal phenotypes,
which would lead to violations of multivariate normality and thus
affect CAZZ  . For example, this may happen when individuals with
higher values of the focal trait are associated with more related
individuals as compared with individuals with lower trait values,
or when individuals with higher trait values have a disproportionally stronger impact on the phenotype of their social partner(s)
(see Appendix S3 for an example using simulations). These types
of non-random distributions may be common in natural populations, but their relative importance in social evolution remains an
empirical question.
The aggregate property zz creates an alternative route between the genes of the focal phenotype and fitness, which resembles other indirect routes in social selection, but is mediated by
the aggregate property zz and its effects on fitness (βI ). Importantly, the links between the aggregate property zz and the genes
of the focal individual may fluctuate over time as the mean values of the social traits change, and thus the effect of βI on the
response to selection will also change. In this case, the covariance between the character zz and the breeding values of the focal individuals (a) may be better represented as a vector CAZZ of
values that will vary across time as the focal phenotype and the
social environment evolve. Furthermore, βI will not only affect
the response to selection directly, but will also affect the patterns
of non-random social assortment of genes in the social environment, because it will impose selection on the traits that affect how
individuals chose, impact or respond to their social environment.

The Evolution of Social Impact,
Responsiveness and Non-Random
Social Assortment
A central question in social evolution is how non-random social assortment, social impact and social responsiveness evolve
(Akçay and Van Cleve 2012; Dingemanse and Araya-Ajoy 2015).
We emphasize that interactive social fitness effects (βI ) impose
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selection on other traits that determine how individuals impact,
respond and “choose” their social environments. Many of the
traits mediating these processes coevolve in context of cooperation (e.g., communication) and competition (e.g., manipulation
versus resistance). Game theorists have addressed the ecological conditions favoring the evolution of strategies responsive to
the social environment (i.e., phenotypically plastic) leading to
conditional ESSs (Tomkins and Hazel 2007) versus unresponsive strategies leading to fixed ESSs. Behavioral ecologists have
also shown that non-random social assortment (i.e., “choice” of
social partners) represents an evolvable element under selection
that is important for the evolution of altruism (Fletcher and Doebeli 2006, 2009). Furthermore, empirical work has confirmed that
these processes can change in response to selection. For instance
social responsiveness of male flies to potential mates (ψz z ) has
been shown to evolve under artificial selection (Chenoweth et al.
2010), and the responsiveness of female crickets to their mate’s
song varies among populations experiencing different ecological
characteristics (Bailey and Zuk 2012). Thus, while the mean relatedness and the mean levels of social impact and responsiveness
may be stable in the short term, they are expected to change over
time in response to consistent selection pressures on the traits that
determine their values. This will in turn further affect any evolutionary response to social and non-social selection (Kazancıoğlu
et al. 2012).
The evolution of individual impact upon, responsiveness to,
and choice of social environments requires genetic variation in
traits underlying these processes. Thus far we have assumed that
ψzz represents the mean impact of a focal’s trait on its social
environment, but this value can vary genetically among individuals (Saltz and Nuzhdin 2014). Therefore, we now represent
it in bold as a vector of values (ψzz ). Hence, the impact of a
given focal trait value for an individual might deviate from the
population mean impact due to differences in another heritable
trait. For example, the impact of a male’s tail length may vary
depending on his inherited ability to perform a courtship display involving the tail. We can also think about this as an interaction between traits of the same individual, where the impact of a trait (tail; z) depends on another trait (its ability to
display; ψzz ). In a similar fashion, social responsiveness (ψz z )
can vary among individuals due to differences in cognitive ability to perceive variation in their social environment (Chenoweth
et al. 2010). The traits that mediate social assortment and determine the mean genetic relatedness of each focal individual to
the rest of their social group (r) can also be conceptualized as
a trait that can evolve (Gardner et al. 2007). For instance, individual variation in the ability to discriminate between individuals of different genotypes may evolve under circumstances where
altruism could be directed to an array of recipients that vary in
relatedness (Hepper 1986).
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Assuming that these traits exhibit genetic variation, then
the evolutionary change in traits affecting relatedness, social
impact, and social responsiveness can be described in terms
of their covariances with fitness: Cov(r, w); Cov(ψzz , w); and
Cov(ψz z , w). Several mechanisms could generate a covariance
between fitness and social assortment, social impact and responsiveness. However, the aim of this section is to highlight that
evolutionary change in these associated characters is expected
when there is a covariance between the aggregate character zz
and individual genetic relatedness (r), social impact (ψzz ), or social responsiveness (ψz z ), combined with an effect of the aggregate character zz on the fitness of the focal individual (βI = 0).
The expected effect of variation in social assortment, social impact and responsiveness on fitness through the aggregate property
zz can be estimated using the formula to calculate the covariance between a vector and a product (Bohrnstedt and Goldberger
1969; Brown and Alexander 1991). For instance, the covariance
between fitness and relatedness (Cov[r, w]) that is caused by the
interactive fitness effects (βI ) can be described as:

r = Cov [r, w] = βI CRZZ 





= βI z̄CRZ  + z̄CRZ + E (r − r̄) (z − z̄) z − z̄ .(8)

We can infer from Equation 8 that the phenotypic distribution caused by variation in relatedness will result in a covariance
between the aggregate trait and individual relatedness (CRZZ  ),
and if the aggregate property zz affects fitness (βI ) then relatedness and fitness will co-vary, imposing selection on any mechanism affecting the relatedness between interacting individuals.

Feedbacks in Social Evolution
Evolutionary feedbacks can arise because interactive fitness effects can change the adaptive value of phenotypes as the social environment evolves, and because it may impose selection
on the traits determining levels of impact, responsiveness and
relatedness. This in turn will shape any subsequent short-term
phenotypic responses to social selection on other social traits
(Kazancıoğlu et al. 2012). In a recursive equation, we can describe the different social processes that may affect the mean phenotype in the subsequent generation z̄t+1 . For simplicity, in Equations 9a and 9b we assume that there is only genetic variance in
the focal phenotype, and in the traits influencing social impact,
responsiveness and relatedness, and also that their respective genetic variance is equal to one. In scenarios where the focal and
social traits are different and there are no reciprocal responses,
the expected mean phenotype in generation t+1 can be described

as:




z̄t+1 = z̄t + βN + βS rt + ψzz t + βI z̄t + z̄t rt + z̄t ψzz t
+ēt+1 ,

(9a)

where the mean phenotype in the next generation (z̄t+1 ) depends
upon the direct selection gradient (βN ), while the contribution
of the social selection gradient is modulated by relatedness and
social impact βS (rt + ψzz t ). In turn, impact, relatedness and the
mean focal and social phenotypes will modulate the effect of the
interactive fitness effects coefficient (βI [z̄t + z̄t rt + z̄t ψzz t ]). In
Equation 9a, ēt+1 reflects the mean effect of the social environment on the expression of the phenotype at time step t+1:



ēt+1 = z̄t + βN ψz z t + βψz z .

(9b)

The effect of the social environment on the expression of
the focal phenotype at time t+1 depends on the mean social environment at time t and the selection experienced by the social
environment (z̄t + β̄N ), mediated by social responsiveness and
selection on social responsiveness (ψz z t + βψz z ). The effect of
social responsiveness is shaped by the selection imposed by interactive fitness effects on the social traits at time t, but its effects
on the phenotype only occur at time t+1 as this is mediated by
phenotypic plasticity. Equations 9a and 9b therefore describe the
potential feedbacks that can arise when the optimal phenotype
for an individual depends upon the phenotype of its social environment. The fates of the social traits may also be determined
by their correlation and feedbacks with other traits (McGlothlin
et al. 2010; Hadfield and Thomson 2017). However, the univariate treatment shown here illustrates the potential for these types
of evolutionary feedbacks in social evolution.
As an example of these feedback, consider the evolution of
helping-at-the-nest in cooperatively breeding birds. In a hypothetical scenario, let z represent the tendency to help in the focal
individual. Helping has a fitness cost to the focal individual (βN
= −0.1), but it is beneficial when a social partner helps the focal individual (βS = 0.7). When interactions are at random (i.e.,
r = 0), the best strategy is not to help but to associate with social
partners that help you. The black lines in Figure 3A show that
under this scenario the tendency to help in the population will
decrease over time. However, if individuals with the tendency to
help associate with each other (r = 0.05), for instance by means
of delayed dispersal causing population viscosity, then individuals with the same genetic tendency to help will interact with
each other. Under this scenario, individuals with the helping tendency will reap the benefits of being helped and the helping tendency will increase over time (Fig. 3A, red lines). The effect of
genetic relatedness (r) within breeding groups has been demonstrated to be crucial in determining the evolution of helping (see
Cornwallis et al. 2009; Wright et al. 2010). Helping behavior will
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Figure 3.

Numerical evaluation of evolutionary change scenarios

using Equations 8 and 9 for the (A) social trait, and (B) the relatedness between interacting individuals. Black lines represent a scenario where individuals interact at random (r = 0) and individuals
that express the behavior are at a direct fitness disadvantaged ( βN
= −0.1). Red lines represent a scenario where individuals interact
preferentially with related individuals ( r̄ = 0.05) and the behavior is favored because of this combination of non-random genetic
assortment and social selection effects (βs = 0.7). Blue lines represent a scenario where, in addition to the negative direct fitness
effects (βN = −0.1) and the positive social selection effects (βS =
0.7), there are interactive effects on fitness ( βI = 0.01) – see Figure 2. This causes the social trait and relatedness to both evolve,
creating a feedback that speeds up the evolution of the social trait,
even under conditions where interacting individuals were initially
unrelated ( r̄1 = 0).

evolve when the benefits of being helped outweigh the costs of
helping others (i.e., rβS > βN ).
The order of events described above follows standard cooperative breeding theory, where the evolution of delayed dispersal
and kin discrimination are important precursors to the evolution
of helping behavior (Koenig and Dickinson 2004, 2016). The
social phenotypes expressed within such cooperative breeding
groups are, however, likely to show interactive effects (βI > 0).
For instance, if helping also causes an increase in the recipient’s subsequent ability to help (e.g., helped young grow faster
and are able to more quickly provide greater help themselves
as a result), then the non-additive benefits from helping will select for mechanisms that allow individuals to preferentially associate even more with related individuals that also have the
helping tendency. Therefore, converse to the standard theory,
the fitness benefits of being helped could feedback and influence
the evolution of greater natal philopatry or ability to discriminate
kin, which would further increase relatedness within groups (blue
line, Fig. 3B) and further favor the evolution of helping (blue line,
Fig. 3A).
Consider also an example from sexual selection with extravagant male ornaments and female mate choice. Let z be the length
of the tail in males of a bird species and z the female preference
for long tails. Having an ornament may come at a direct selection
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cost (βN = -0.1), perhaps because it decreases a male’s ability
to escape from predators, which males with less attractive ornaments do not pay. This would normally lead to shorter tails across
time (black lines, Fig. 3A). However, when males with ornaments
encounter females with the preference, ornamented males will
have higher fitness than the males without. The adaptive value of
the ornament in each episode of selection is thus dependent upon
the interaction fitness coefficient and the mean preference in the
population (βI z̄ ). If there is variation in the processes by which
males encounter females, these interactive fitness effects will favor mechanisms (r) where long-tailed males encounter females
with the preference for long tails. This will lead to the evolution
of strategies, such as the use of leks for sexual display by longtailed males that could be located in places frequented by females
with the preference (i.e., “hot-spots”; Beehler and Foster 1988),
and this will in turn select for even longer-tailed males even when
they were initially selected against (blue lines, Fig. 3A). Similarly, if there are behavioral displays that amplify the impact
(ψZZ ) of an ornament (Bogaardt and Johnstone 2016), for instance a dancing display, this will further benefit males that have
long tails and perform the dancing display, further favoring the
evolution of even longer tails. Our model thus links previously
separated ideas in sexual selection and highlights the evolution
of sequences of traits due to feedbacks.
We acknowledge that in many instances the evolution of
social assortment, impact, and responsiveness are more complicated than we have depicted. The evolutionary dynamics of
impact, responsiveness and non-random social assortment are
especially complicated in scenarios involving evolutionary conflicts of interest. Specifically, the co-evolution of impact and responsiveness are intertwined in any game theoretical scenario
of conditional ESSs and in the additional complexity of behavioral dynamics in any manipulation versus resistance or response
versus counter-response (McNamara et al. 1999). This includes
social interactions such as biparental care, collective vigilance,
agonistic interactions, kin competition, and parent-offspring conflict (Westneat and Fox 2010). Despite all this complexity, it is
only by decomposing and understanding the anatomy of different episodes of social selection that we will be able to unravel the
types of behavioral and evolutionary dynamics resulting from the
interplay between the evolutionary interests of interacting individuals, and how they might end in specific evolutionarily stable
equilibria.

Conclusions
In this paper, we have integrated key theoretical elements regarding social evolution and presented them using a set of path
diagrams intended to stimulate empirical measurement of key
pathways. We describe the links between long-term predictions
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of evolutionary stability by game theory models and short-term
quantitative genetics models providing statistical descriptions of
single episodes of selection. This synthesis highlights that interactive effects on fitness of focal and social partner traits can generate evolutionary feedbacks between social traits, the social environment and the processes allowing individuals to “choose,”
impact, and/or respond to their social environment. We explicitly
discuss these feedbacks in terms of pathways that are constructed
based upon sets of multiple regression coefficients, which allows
most of the parameters outlined here to be suitable for estimation
in empirical studies. It is likely that many, if not all, the paths
to social evolution in Figure 2C will interact to determine the
selective landscape in a multi-trait context, further affecting the
responses to selection (McGlothlin et al. 2010; Queller 2011; Van
Cleve and Akçay 2014). Measuring these paths will not be easy.
However, by isolating the distinct processes affecting the expression and adaptive value of social traits during any specific episode
of selection, we may better understand the ecological conditions
determining eventual evolutionary outcomes resulting from social interactions. We hope that this paper encourages empiricists
to estimate interactive fitness effects and thus better connect empirical studies with the different fields of theory studying social
evolution.
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